November 9, 2026
The recent Democratic victories in the American midterm elections have changed the political balance in Washington and opened a new phase in the Trump presidency. But the economic nationalism, protectionism and strategic competition reshaping international relations are unlikely to disappear with any single administration.
That Canada’s pursuit of greater resilience and strategic autonomy must remain a long-term national priority will be evident in Prime Minister Mark Carney’s four-summit diplomatic swing from Ireland for the European Political Community Summit on November 12th to Manila for ASEAN to Phnom Penh for La Francophonie to Shenzhen for APEC on November 19th.
When Carney returns to Asia this week, he will do so with significant diplomatic achievements to build on and considerably higher stakes to manage. A year ago, his first Indo-Pacific tour was about raising Canada’s profile, rebuilding relationships and opening new economic opportunities. Since then, Canada has stabilized relations with China, advanced major trade negotiations with ASEAN and the Philippines, and deepened strategic partnerships across the region.
Carney has also emerged as a prominent voice for middle-power cooperation. His widely discussed Davos speech offered a compelling diagnosis of a changing international order and a call to action for countries to work more closely together to preserve their sovereignty and strategic autonomy. His upcoming participation in four summits across Europe and Asia offers an opportunity to advance that agenda, but also to test how well it resonates with partners navigating their own difficult geopolitical choices.
The geopolitical backdrop makes this trip particularly significant. China has confirmed discussions about a possible meeting between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin at the APEC summit in Shenzhen. Whether or not such a meeting takes place, the prospect reinforces the relevance of Carney’s warning about unconstrained great-power politics.
Canada’s diplomatic position has nevertheless improved considerably over the past year, due in no small part to Carney’s personal engagement. Just as important as Carney’s extensive international travel is the growing willingness of Asian leaders to come to Canada.
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. visited in July, while Vietnam’s Tô Lâm followed in September. Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong and India’s Prime Minister Modi are expected to visit in December. High-level exchanges with China have also resumed, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Ottawa in May and Vice-Premier He Lifeng’s visit to Vancouver, unfolding at this writing.
This two-way diplomacy reflects Canada’s growing relevance to partners seeking to diversify their own relationships in an increasingly uncertain world. But it also raises expectations. The next phase of Carney’s Indo-Pacific engagement will require greater strategic discipline, particularly in managing relations with China and capitalizing on opportunities in Southeast Asia.
China: Stability Without Dependence
Perhaps the most consequential change since last year has been the stabilization of relations with Beijing. Carney’s meeting with Xi Jinping on the margins of last year’s APEC summit ended years of diplomatic estrangement, while his subsequent visit to China in January established a new strategic partnership and helped resolve several longstanding trade disputes. High-level engagement has since resumed, including the revival of economic and trade dialogues that had been dormant for years.
These are meaningful achievements.
China is an important market for Canadian agriculture, energy and natural resources, and Carney is right to seek a more stable and predictable economic relationship. But stabilization should not be confused with normalization. More frequent dialogue does not eliminate the underlying risks in the relationship. China’s willingness to use economic dependence as an instrument of political pressure has not disappeared, and future political disagreements could once again spill over into trade.
The canola experience offers a cautionary lesson. While China accounts for about five per cent of Canada’s total merchandise exports, it purchased nearly 70 per cent of our canola seed exports in 2024. That concentration left Canadian producers particularly vulnerable when trade disputes erupted, first in 2019 and again in 2025.
The reduction of tariffs on canola seed earlier this year and the recent extension of favourable market access for canola meal and other agricultural products through 2028 are welcome developments. But Canada should use this period of relative stability to diversify markets for its canola products, not recreate the same dependence that has repeatedly exposed producers to political pressure.
The next phase of engagement with China presents even more difficult choices. Ottawa wants to increase exports to China by 50 per cent by 2030 while exploring opportunities for Chinese investment in electric vehicles, clean energy and advanced manufacturing. These ambitions reflect legitimate economic interests, but they must be reconciled with the equally important objective of strengthening Canada’s industrial capabilities and reducing its vulnerability to coercion. Diversifying away from the United States will accomplish little if it simply creates new concentrations of strategic dependence with China.
The more Canada engages economically with China, the more sophisticated its economic-security safeguards and tools of statecraft must become.
The agreement allowing limited imports of Chinese electric vehicles, partly in anticipation of investment in Canadian automotive manufacturing, illustrates the dilemma. Such investment could create jobs and support domestic production, but it also raises questions about intellectual property, sensitive data, cybersecurity and dependence on Chinese technology and supply chains. Unlike disruptions to commodity exports, the consequences of losing industrial capacity or control over critical technologies can be much harder to reverse.
Europe’s experience should give Canada further pause. European leaders are increasingly alarmed by Chinese industrial overcapacity, persistent trade imbalances and the resulting pressures on domestic manufacturing. If Europe, with its much larger market and industrial base, is struggling to manage these pressures, Canada needs to be especially deliberate about the terms of deeper economic integration with China.
This is not an argument for closing the door to Chinese trade and investment but for a more selective approach, backed by stronger economic-security tools and closer coordination with trusted partners. Canada needs rigorous investment screening, better protection of intellectual property and sensitive technologies, and a clearer understanding of its vulnerabilities in critical supply chains, advanced manufacturing and strategic infrastructure.
It also needs the capacity to anticipate, deter and respond to economic coercion, rather than simply manage the consequences after Canadian exporters have been targeted.
This cannot be accomplished through domestic measures alone. Canada should work more closely with the EU, Japan, Australia and other partners to share intelligence on economic vulnerabilities and coordinate responses to coercive trade measures.
Prime Minister Carney has accomplished much of the immediate diplomatic repair with China. The harder task now is to build a more productive relationship without recreating the vulnerabilities that made Canada susceptible to economic pressure in the first place. The more Canada engages economically with China, the more sophisticated its economic-security safeguards and tools of statecraft must become.
ASEAN: From Market Access to Strategic Partnerships
In Southeast Asia, the challenge is different. Canada has made important progress expanding its diplomatic and commercial access but has yet to establish an economic presence commensurate with the opportunities the region offers.
A central ambition of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy was to build a deeper relationship with ASEAN. Carney’s participation in the Manila summit as Guest of the Chair, and the expected conclusion of negotiations on a Canada-ASEAN free trade agreement, would mark an important milestone in that effort. Two-way merchandise trade reached $52.5 billion in 2025, up nearly 24 per cent from the previous year. Yet Canada remains only ASEAN’s 16th-largest trading partner, a reminder of how much ground it still has to cover.
Canada is competing in a region where China, Japan, South Korea and Australia have long-established trade, investment, and production networks, many reinforced by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. A Canada-ASEAN free trade agreement will improve market access, but tariff reductions alone will not overcome the advantages of more established regional competitors.
The larger opportunity is to become a partner for Southeast Asia’s industrial and technological development. ASEAN economies are seeking to move into higher-value manufacturing, strengthen supply chains, attract investment and develop domestic technological capabilities. Canada’s strengths in energy, critical minerals, agricultural technology, advanced manufacturing and artificial intelligence offer considerable opportunities for cooperation.
The Philippines offers a promising example of what this deeper engagement can look like. Following President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s visit to Vancouver in July, the two countries elevated relations to a Strategic Partnership and accelerated negotiations toward a bilateral free trade agreement. Equally significant has been the rapid expansion of defence cooperation, including new agreements enabling closer military engagement, joint maritime activities — notably the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) inaugural active participation in May’s annual multinational Exercise BALIKATAN (meaning “shoulder-to-shoulder” in Tagalog) — and Canadian support for maritime domain awareness.
The decision to base Lieutenant-General Derek Macaulay, Canada’s inaugural Senior Military Representative for the Indo-Pacific, in Manila further signals Ottawa’s commitment to a sustained regional security presence. Together, these developments position the Philippines as an important anchor for Canada’s broader Southeast Asia engagement, demonstrating how economic, defence and technological cooperation can reinforce one another.
Carney also has an opportunity to bring his Davos message on strategic autonomy to a region where the concept is already deeply familiar. Countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have spent decades navigating relations with competing great powers while preserving their freedom of action. For them, diversification and maintaining multiple partnerships are not new strategic ideas but longstanding necessities.
This offers both an opening and a lesson for Canada. Southeast Asian countries are not looking to join an anti-China coalition or choose between Washington and Beijing. They want partners that expand their options, strengthen domestic capabilities and respect their strategic flexibility. Carney’s message will resonate most strongly if Canada demonstrates that it can contribute to these objectives rather than simply appeal to shared concerns about the unrestrained exercise of great-power influence.
From Diplomatic Progress to Strategic Advantage
Carney’s trip is also significant because it extends beyond the Indo-Pacific. His participation in the European Political Community summit in Dublin and the Francophonie summit in Phnom Penh underscore a renewed level of Canadian engagement across regions and multilateral institutions. The gathering in Phnom Penh offers an opportunity to deepen relations with Francophone partners across Asia, Africa and Europe, while preparing for Canada’s hosting of the summit in 2028.
Taken together, the four summits reflect the logic of Carney’s emerging foreign policy: building overlapping networks of partnerships that can advance Canada’s interests in trade, security, technology and economic resilience.
Carney has done much of the initial work of rebuilding relationships and establishing a clearer direction for Canadian foreign policy. His middle-power diplomacy has raised Canada’s international profile and created opportunities that would have seemed unlikely only a year ago.
But sustaining that momentum will require greater prioritization, stronger institutions, and a more disciplined approach to converting diplomatic relationships into economic and strategic advantages.
Policy Contributing Writer Vina Nadjibulla is co-founder and CEO of the Centre for Strategic Statecraft and a Balsillie Scholar at the Balsillie School of International Affairs.
